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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
FRANK MADRID, : Case No. 981404-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for Burglary, 
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202, 
and Attempted Theft, a class A misdemeanor (attempted theft of 
property valued between $1000 and $5000), in violation of §§ 76-6-
404 and 76-4-101 (1995), in the Third Judicial District Court, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Roger A. Livingston, judge, presiding. 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996) . See Addendum A (judgment and conviction) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION 
I. Did Appellant receive ineffective assistance of counsel 
where his attorneys failed to move to dismiss the burglary charge 
for insufficient evidence? 
Standard of Review: "[A] claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel [] raised for the first time on appeal without an 
evidentiary hearing [] presents a question of law" reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Bryant, 1998 WL 469851 *2 (Utah App. 1998) 
(citing State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 175 (Utah App. 1992)). 
"However, ''appellate review of counsel's performance must be 
highly deferential.''" Id. (quoting State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 
461, 466 (Utah App. 1993); quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). 
Preservation: This issue is reviewable for the first time on 
appeal because (1) Appellant is represented by new counsel, and (2) 
the record is adequate for review.1 See State v. Hovater, 914 P. 2d 
37, 40 (Utah 1996) (citing State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 
(Utah 1991)) . 
II. Did the trial court err in allowing the State to submit 
a flight instruction where there was no evidence of flight? 
Standard of Review: "'[T]he propriety of a jury instruction 
presents a question of law7" reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Carlson, 934 P. 2d 657, 659 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (quoting State v. 
Brooks, 833 P.2d 362, 363 (Utah Ct.App.1992)). 
Preservation: Appellant's challenge to the submission of the 
flight instruction is preserved at R.110[176,215]. 
STATUTE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes and constitutional provisions are 
determinative of the issues on appeal: 
Amendment VI, United States Constitution: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
1
 A record is adequate for review for purposes of a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel "if the trial record is adequate 
to permit decision of the issue." Humphries, 818 P. 2d at 1029. 
There is ample information in the record of the case at bar to 
determine the sufficiency issue presented on appeal. See infra 
Point I. Hence, a Rule 23B motion to remand is not requested nor 
necessary to determine Madrid's ineffective assistance claim. See 
Utah R. App. P. 23B (1998) . 
2 
Article T Section ]; -1* -: Constitution: 
.., ^jLiiux: ..•fL.a'^ uny Liie dccuseu ^nail hav e the right t :: 
appear a: ~d in person and by counsel. 
(1- A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains 
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with 
intent to commit a . . . theft. 
(2; Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was 
committed in a dwelling, :h- which event it is a felony of the 
second degree. 
Theft ., I J1 :ah Code Am :i § ; 5 6 404 (19:95) : 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized 
control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive 
him thereof. 
Attempt " .in ^ wde An L I . > . . ) : 
(III ) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt 
to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability 
otherwise required for the commission of the offense, he 
engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward the 
commission of the offense. (2) For purposes of this part, 
conduct does not constitute a substantial step unless it is 
strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the 
offense, (3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall 
arise: (a) because the offense attempted was actually 
committed; or (b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the 
offense could have been committed had the attendant 
circumstanrp.q been as the Rc-f - beli^u^H t-h^ m t-n Vv-. 
Criminal Responsibility For Direct Commission Of Offense Or 
F' : ] Conduct Of Another, IJt^ h roHe Ann § 76-9~9n? ficqr\ 
Every person, acting with the mental state iequired for the 
commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, who 
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally 
aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an 
offense shall be criminally liable as a partv for- snch 
conduct, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant Frank Madrid (".Madrid") was charged by in.formati.on 
with one count of burglary :.n violation of Utah Code Ann, § ~**.-^  
2( - ' ' • • . p- I u n p ^ r f - y i ra 1 n i a 
3 
$5000 in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995) . Record 
("R") at 1-3,36-38. A warrant was issued, R.4, and Madrid was 
tried before a jury. R.110. The jury convicted Madrid of burglary 
as charged and of the lesser included offense of attempted theft of 
property valued between $1000 and $5000. R.87-89; see Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-6-404 and 76-4-101. 
Defense counsel challenged the State's request to submit a 
flight instruction on the basis that there was no evidence of 
flight presented at trial. R.110[214-15]; R.80 (flight 
instruction). Over counsel's objection, the trial court allowed 
the instruction to go to the jury. Id. Madrid appeals from the 
trial court's decision. 
Defense counsel filed a motion at the close of Madrid's 
preliminary hearing to dismiss the burglary charge for insufficient 
evidence. R.108[40]. Counsel argued that "identification is 
lacking" on the basis that nothing linked Madrid to the burglary 
insofar as he was only seen walking on the sidewalk and the other 
person was never identified. Id. Moreover, although the victim 
had subsequently spotted Madrid's car in the neighborhood, such 
evidence was not sufficient to bind the case over given that Madrid 
in fact resided a few blocks away from the burgled home. Id. 
The trial court denied defense counsel's motion. R.108 [41-
42] . However, Madrid's attorney did not renew the motion in the 
form of a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence at the close 
of the State's case, nor did he move for a mistrial when the jury 
returned its guilty verdict. R.110. Madrid appeals the burglary 
4 
convictior. -?: - he basis of insufficient evidence in the context of 
a , .;.. : ineiiective assistance of counsel. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Ray Paddoov ' PaddocK' • w^;/ Lw iixs dpaiiii^ iiL . ~ne basement: :. a 
home located at 985 East Elqin Avenue owned by a friend, Paul 
construLL.-^i *ork v_n L ne apartment ai±a nao .101 yen moved 11. . -;. 
Needing some tools which were located at. his place of work, Paddock 
h Paddock left, a ; J :ne doors • ••. -- . .-ir-
closed arri locked, including the back entrance used £y :.r:t __ 
acce^ 
Paddock returned tu fina a red Ford Escort parked in his usual 
spot on s -treet runnina along the side of the home. 'P : lf^ [1251 . 
ia. he proceeded v. tne bacK door and saw tna: ".' was aijar ana :>r.e 
of r ne panes <^f glass ir- *~n<=* door window was broken. ^ "1 1 t * 1 '*~; \ . 
*. 
R.li • :.'12r.' a d d o c k a s k e a t::e man wnat he was do i n g i:= the yard, 
f •" ^ ^ **OL answer and instead ran ^^ L**W iea ^0.1. 
i 
Meanwhile, Paddock observed, another man, later identified as 
Madrid, walking along th-? sidewalk toward the same red car. 
Id. Madrid responded that he had not been in the yard, and that r>r 
had come from a van that was parked down the street. Id. Paddock 
did not recall whether he saw the van referred to by Madrid. Id. 
However, Paddock noted that Madrid seemed "panicky" and was walking 
quickly toward the driver's side of the red car. R. 110 [128] . Both 
Madrid and the other man got into the car and drove off. 
R.110 [130] . Paddock wrote down the license plate number and called 
the police. R.110[128-29]. 
Paddock went into the house. R.110[129]. At the top of the 
stair, he saw his own stereo plus Reeve's stereo, computer and 
about 10 0 compact discs packed in a duffle bag and box. Id. When 
Paddock had left the apartment earlier, those items were in their 
appropriate places throughout the house. Id. 
Sergeant James Nelson ("Nelson") of the Salt Lake City Police 
Department ("SLCPD") investigated the report of a burglary at the 
Reeves home. R.110[158-59] . He ran the license plate number 
listed in the report. R. 110 [158] . He found that it was registered 
to Frank Madrid and was linked to a car matching the description of 
the car noted in the report. Id. The license plate number was 
also linked to an address that was just a few blocks from the scene 
of the burglary. R.110 [161]. 
Nelson pulled a four-year-old photo of Madrid from a SLCPD 
data base. Id. Based on that photo and with the assistance of a 
computer, Nelson compiled a photo line-up with pictures of other 
individuals that were similar in height, weight, hair and eye 
6 
color.2 Td u ^ showed the lir.9 ur * - iraddock about one month 
di:t; c::e :::i- ;.:.., aair^n^^i'.In^ :*I:L. „:^.. the suspect may or may not 
be included. R.110[163- Paddock immediately identified the photo 
-?* Madrid as "h" ^v: lie saw w<^  ' •• •,.- " "  ': ; • ' *->^-> 0 
[i^ -j. , . . raa^ojA also statea ctiau aiiOt;i-.-i pnotc -L.I; tn^ spread 
looked like the man that: i ^ mped the fence, K :10':'""7" • -x . ive 
1 i r - < i i .*-• * 
Madria, however , ;• .. u •. i4 ; . . - • i . 
On .January -, 1998, an arrest warrant was issued and Madrid 
was a/pp • -: ~ :x :ie :il - - --j ; ;- *: •*•-
was never i den t i f i ed ui apprehended. 
Mill!: 5 U M E N T 
I. MADRID WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHERE DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT ARGUE THAT 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE BURGLARY OR 
ATTEMPTED THEFT CONVICTIONS. 
The Six-.:* Amendment ~^ United States Constitution 
g u a r a n t e e s " ._,.. ^ -_ _rinH~ -; ri-rose^utions, the a c c u s e d s h a l l er.^oy 
i . _ . 
defence." See also Utah Const. Art S 12 (guaranteeing the 
right r.« the presence of an attorney). 
r
 r a t r- .,"-,111;"!I i I u i i,.,»ii,»i I I " .' i n e f f : e c I i v«•- 1 1 p i e s t ; j \ \ n I i < >ii, 
a defendant, rti-.ist establish that .is counsel's performance was 
so deficien* i below ar>
 0p-ject:^e standard of 
performance, there .is d reasonable prooability that the outcome of 
2
 Madrid does not challenge M*/ propriety f the photo or 
oerson lin^-vr^ ~" appeal. 
the trial would have been different." State v. Hovater, 914 P.2d 
37, 39 (Utah 1996) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Templin, 805 
P.2d 182, 186-87 (Utah 1990)). 
In assessing counsel's performance, there is a presumption 
that he or she "rendered adequate assistance." Taylor v. Warden, 
905 P. 2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995) . Moreover, counsel's actions are not 
questioned unless there is no possible tactical explanation. Id. 
As to prejudice, the United States Supreme Court in Strickland 
noted, "reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome." 466 U.S. at 694. 
Furthermore, prejudice is assessed in light of "the totality of the 
evidence, taking into account such factors as whether the errors 
affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect 
and how strongly the verdict is supported by the record." Id. 
Under the foregoing criteria, the failure of Madrid's attorney 
to move to dismiss the charges for insufficient evidence and to 
move to dismiss notwithstanding the jury's verdict amounts to 
ineffective assistance in that it does not meet an "'objective 
standard of reasonableness,'" and it prejudiced the outcome of 
Madrid's trial. Hovater, 914 P.2d at 39 (quoting Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 688). 
A. The Failure Of Madrid's Counsel To Move To Dismiss The 
Burglary Charge And To Move For A Mistrial Falls Below 
Reasonable Professional Standards. 
In the present case, it was not professionally reasonable nor 
in any way conceivably tactical, see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; 
8 
Taylor, 90s P ?d at 282. fry defense conn?^1 to n ^ arcru? a motion 
..:_-. ..".. _-: :=- .. •-. '_::ei'_. . :;d: J - J '-A.: :-e 
state rested ::r to move to dismiss the conviction after the jury 
returned ^+ nil*-- verdi ~*~ because the evidence here does not 
•:i:, •_:.> „_<_:i.v. .-•__ . - _t:_„r crime. 
In -rdei 10 secure t.\-j convictions, rhe State had the burden 
-ri^"1 " * , ™ ^ r ^ bevond ^-as^nir ! • - • • - v v3,:r --*. 
"enter Leaj 01 ^ e:»^-;;
 t ^ o ^ . ^ . I M . . , . , « L - U ^ X ^ ,Z:,^ norne .^ -r 
Paddock and R e e v e s ) w i t h i? . \ - nr t o ccmm. ". .-.:* . Si ah ./ode 
An" O - 2 - Z L u i ; r - ; ! - . r - . . , _ . 
culpable Lty otT v - ov- :.qu.,cv; : 01 „.ii^  c\_. -.loo^n . ;..:i; . 
engage [d] conduct constitut[ing] ; substantial step toward 
[theft ] " • : i< - t . t .<-' • • . • - d ] 
or tAci'CjLc; 10^ mauthorizea control u v a _~e property of another 
with the purpose to deprive him thereof. " !'* ih Code An' 76-6-404 
toi t,i^  commission . -. burglary ana attempted theft, aiij that he] 
solicit led I equest [ed] ommandied ncourage [d] , r*r 
theft] " Utah Oode An:. /o-2-202 H9v5y .principal liability cl-
an accomplice'^ , - also State v. Hill, 727 P,2d J.21 , 222 (Utah 
1986) ( ' • - *• . ; | _ 1 e-niHT " 
burglary beyond reasonaio^e aouDt; . 
However, as defense counsel noted himself at the preliminary 
h^^1 - ' -" * 
where the buj.jj.ary occurred or that '--r ^L.herw:se aia-
9 
burglary and attempted theft. Accordingly, the jury must have had 
a reasonable doubt as to Madrid's guilt, see Hill, 727 P. 2d at 222, 
and reasonable counsel would have made the argument to dismiss the 
charges and conviction. 
Although this Court declined to address whether an attorney's 
failure to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence falls below a 
reasonable professional standard, see Butterfield v. Cook, 817 P. 2d 
333, 338 (Utah App. 1991); see also infra Point I.B. (discussing 
case in further detail) , a review of the facts of this case in 
light of other case law demonstrates the viability of a challenge 
to the sufficiency of the evidence and, consequently, how defense 
counsel's failure to do so falls below a reasonable standard of 
professional responsibility. 
The State presented the following circumstantial evidence in 
support of the charges against Madrid: Paddock arrived at his home 
at eleven-thirty a.m. to find the back door ajar and a pane of 
glass in the door broken. R.110[128]. Inside, a number of 
electronics and compact discs belonging to his roommate and himself 
were piled up and packed in boxes; the items were not in that place 
or in that condition when he left the home earlier that morning. 
R. 110 [129]. Prior to entering the home, Paddock saw a man run 
across the back yard of his home and jump the fence enclosing the 
yard. R.110 [126] . Paddock asked the man what he was doing in the 
yard, but the man did not respond. Id. Instead, the man jumped 
into a red Ford Escort parked on the street alongside the home. 
R.110 [128] . 
10 
Paddock simultaneously saw another man walk up the sidewalk 
toward the same red car. R.110[127]. According to Paddock, the 
man was never seen on the premises of the house. Id. Nonetheless, 
Paddock testified that he asked the man what he was doing in the 
yard. Id. The man replied that he was not in the yard, but rather 
looking at a van parked down the street. Id. Paddock could not 
recall whether or not he saw the van. Id. According to Paddock, 
the man seemed "panicky" and was walking at a brisk pace. 
R.110 [128] . He then proceeded to hop in the driver's side of the 
red Ford Escort and drove away. R.110[130]. 
Paddock copied the license plate number of the red car and 
reported the burglary to the police. R.110 [128-29] . Sergeant 
Nelson of the SLCPD investigated the report. R.100 [158-59] . He 
researched the license plate number and found that it was linked to 
a red Ford Escort registered to Frank Madrid at an address that was 
just a few blocks from the crime scene. R.110[158]. Nelson then 
compiled a photo line-up including a four-year old picture of 
Madrid, the Appellant in this case. R.110 [161] . One month after 
the incident, Nelson showed Paddock the line-up and Paddock 
identified the photo of Madrid as that of the man seen walking 
along the sidewalk and who drove the red car away. R. 110 [163]. 
Paddock then speculated that another person in the line-up may have 
been the other individual seen running from the yard. R.110 [171] . 
At a live line-up conducted four months later, Paddock was unable 
to identify Madrid. R.110[143,146]. 
Over two months after the burglary, Madrid was arrested 
11 
pursuant to a warrant. R.4. The other individual seen jumping 
over the fence, however, was neither identified nor apprehended. 
Such evidence, even when viewed in a light most favorable to 
the jury's verdict3, does not sufficiently support the burglary or 
attempted theft convictions. As an initial matter, the State did 
not present any direct evidence establishing that Madrid "enter[ed] 
or remain[ed] unlawfully" in the Paddock/Reeves residence "with the 
intent to commit . . . theft," Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(1), or 
that he exercised unauthorized control over the items inside. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-404. Paddock testified only that he saw Madrid on 
the public sidewalk running alongside the property, but that he was 
never on the premises or actually in the house. R.110 [127]. 
Moreover, the person seen running out of the yard was never 
identified or apprehended and, therefore, no accomplice testimony 
linked Madrid to the incident. Finally, the State did not present 
any evidence directly tying Madrid to the crime scene, such as his 
fingerprints on any of the personal belongings found bundled in the 
house. 
The circumstantial evidence, which constitutes all of the 
evidence in this case, likewise falls short of establishing the 
elements of burglary or attempted theft and, in fact, are as 
consistent with innocence as with guilt. In State v. Hill, 727 
3
 For claims of insufficient evidence, a reviewing court 
views the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a 
light most favorable to the jury verdict. Jury verdicts are 
reversed where reasonable minds must have entertained a doubt as to 
the defendant's guilt. See State v. Vicrh, 871 P. 2d 1030, 1034 
(Utah App. 1994). 
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P.2d 221 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court noted, " [w]here the 
only evidence presented against the defendant is circumstantial, 
the evidence supporting a conviction must preclude every reasonable 
hypothesis of innocence. This is because the existence of a 
reasonable hypothesis of innocence necessarily raises a reasonable 
doubt as to the defendant's guilt." Id. at 222 (citation omitted) . 
Under this principle, Utah Courts have upheld convictions 
either directly or based on accomplice liability only where the 
circumstantial evidence was strong and did not support any theory 
of innocence. For example, in People v. Morton, 11 P. 512 (Utah 
1886), the Utah Supreme Court upheld a burglary conviction where it 
was "impossible to account for the presence of the [defendant] " in 
a closed store except to commit larceny. Id. at 513. The 
defendant was apprehended near the store's safe and a drill bit 
suitable for boring into the steel safe was found on the floor 
where he stood. Id.; see also State v. Burch, 413 P.2d 805 (Utah 
1966) (affirming burglary conviction supported by "strong 
circumstantial evidence;" defendant was apprehended in burgled 
building and seen running from room containing safe with materials 
usable in burglary); State v. Johnson, 305 P.2d 488 (Utah 1956) 
(affirming burglary conviction based on accomplice liability; 
defendant was seen looking in window of burgled store while 
companion was inside, and was then seen walking rapidly towards the 
rear of the building); State v. Murphy, 489 P.2d 430 (Utah 1971) 
(sufficient evidence to find defendant was principal in murder 
where he drove codefendant to store, codefendant fatally shot owner 
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inside while defendant sat with car running, then defendant drove 
codefendant to another car waiting one block away). 
Conversely, convictions have been reversed where the 
circumstantial evidence is ambiguous, leaving open a reasonable 
doubt. This is so even where the defendant had a close association 
with the perpetrator and was seen at or near the crime scene 
shortly before or after the crime occurred. 
For example, in Hill, the defendant went to an antiques shop 
in Utah and discussed with the shop owner certain items of 
interest. 727 P. 2d at 222. The next day, the shop owner 
discovered that her store had been burgled and several items, 
including those noted by defendant, were gone. Id. Police tracked 
defendant to his home in Oregon and found some chairs from the Utah 
store. Id. Defendant produced a bill of sale. Id. Meanwhile, an 
interview with a third person revealed that a Jack Hall, who was 
acquainted with defendant's brother, stole the items and took the 
chairs to the defendant. Id. Although the evidence gave rise to 
the hypothesis that defendant was an accomplice in the burglary, 
the Utah Supreme Court reversed because the evidence also 
"support[ed] a hypothesis that Hall committed the burglary without 
the assistance, encouragement, or knowledge of [the defendant]." 
Id. 
One year later, the Supreme Court similarly reversed an 
aggravated robbery conviction for insufficient evidence in State v. 
Kalisz. 735 P. 2d 60 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) . As in Hill, the 
evidence against the defendant painted a suspicious picture but was 
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not enough to support the guilty verdict. Id. at 61. In that 
case, the defendant Kalisz and a man named Remington test drove a 
car from a used car lot. Id. Kalisz alone returned the car 
several hours later. Id. Minutes before Kalisz returned the car, 
a robbery at a shopping center was reported. Id. Kalisz admitted 
that he was with Remington all day. Id. He claimed and that he 
took Remington to a hospital, a story that was later proved to be 
untrue. Id. A search of Kalisz's person, residence and the car 
turned up no evidence of the robbery. Id. 
Reversing the aggravated robbery conviction, the Court 
reasoned that the State failed to "present any evidence that placed 
Kalisz at the scene of the robbery or in the getaway car or linked 
him to the crime through possession of any of the stolen goods." 
Id. Moreover, the "circumstantial evidence connecting Kalisz to 
Remington and the crime is insufficient to prove that Kalisz was 
with Remington during or immediately after the robbery and that he 
had the requisite mental state for the crime with which he was 
charged." Id. 
Like Hill and Kalisz, the circumstantial evidence in this case 
does not adequately establish that Madrid entered and remained 
unlawfully in the Paddock/Reeves house with the intent to commit 
theft, or that he in any way solicited or had knowledge of the 
burglary and attempted theft that was occurring. In fact, the 
circumstantial evidence here is ambiguous, leaving open a 
"reasonable hypothesis of innocence." Hill, 727 P.2d at 222. 
First, as with the defendants in Kalisz and Hill, Madrid's mere 
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association with the perpetrator, temporal proximity to the crime, 
and proximity to the crime scene is not a sufficient basis for the 
burglary charge. See, e.g., Kalisz, 735 P.2d at 61 (insufficient 
evidence although defendant drove with perpetrator and returned 
with car minutes after robbery was reported); Hill (insufficient 
evidence although defendant was at burgled store day before 
incident and showed interest in and was later found with goods 
stolen from store). 
Moreover, the State presented no evidence indicating Madrid 
"solicited or encouraged [the other man] to commit the burglary or 
even knew that he was [doing] it." Hill, 727 P.2d at 222. Like 
Kalisz, the evidence suggests only that Madrid and the unknown man 
(the likely perpetrator of the crime) rode in a car together within 
a relatively short time of the offense. See, 735 P. 2d at 61. 
Nothing suggests, however, that Madrid knew that the man jumping 
over the fence and who got into his car seized an opportunity to 
burgle a house while Madrid looked at a van parked down the street. 
See id.; Hill, 727 P.2d at 222. 
That the entire incident occurred in Madrid's neighborhood 
further highlights the ambiguity of the evidence in this case. As 
opposed to being in a foreign neighborhood across town where he 
might have no legitimate business, Madrid was walking along a 
street just a few blocks from his own home when he was spotted 
close to the crime scene and later identified in a photo line-up by 
Paddock. R. 110 [127,161,163-64] . It is not unusual for a person to 
walk within his own environs and to be seen by other neighbors 
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doing so. A person's neighborhood is the most likely place where 
he or she would see something of interest (i.e., the van) and stop 
to take a look simply by virtue of the fact that that is where they 
spend a majority of their time. Accordingly, there remains a 
"reasonable hypothesis of innocence" to the extent that Madrid was 
looking at a van in his own neighborhood while another person 
seized an opportunity to burgle a home. Hill, 727 P.2d at 222. 
In addition, Madrid's allegedly panicked demeanor and his 
quick pace to the car likewise does not tip the balance toward 
sufficiency since nervous behavior on the part of a suspect, when 
confronted about a possible crime, is as consistent with innocence 
as it is with criminal behavior. See, e.g., State v. Sykes, 840 
P.2d 825, 828 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Lovegren, 829 P.2d 155, 
158 (Utah App. 1992) . In the present case, Madrid was both 
confronted about a possible crime to the extent that Paddock asked 
Madrid what he was doing in the yard, even though, as Paddock 
admitted, Madrid was never seen on the premises. R.110[127]. 
Moreover, Madrid likely saw the other man jump over the fence and 
thereby knew that something was up. Hence, he was conscious of the 
other man's guilt which prompted his panic and his quickened pace. 
This, however, does not suffice to support the convictions here 
since it is not necessarily evidence of actual guilt for these 
crimes in particular. See infra Point II (discussing Madrid's 
behavior with regard to the trial court's erroneous submission of 
a flight instruction). 
In sum, the evidence in the present case is entirely 
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circumstantial and does not "preclude every reasonable hypothesis 
of innocence." Hill, 727 P.2d at 222. Hence, the State did not 
present sufficient evidence to establish the elements of burglary 
or attempted theft beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. In light of the 
weak circumstantial evidence, and case law demonstrating the 
viability of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, 
defense counsel's performance was deficient in that it did not meet 
reasonable professional standards. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
694. His deficient performance is underscored given that he raised 
the identical issue at the preliminary hearing and therefore was 
aware of the inherent weakness in the State's case. R.108[40]. 
Moreover, there could have been no conceivable tactical reason 
for defense counsel's failure given that he could have done so 
outside the presence of the jury, thereby avoiding any risk of 
bringing undue attention to facts less favorable to Madrid's case. 
See Taylor, 905 P.2d at 282. Accordingly, the first prong of the 
Strickland test regarding a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel is met here. 
B. The Ineffective Assistance Rendered By Madrid's Counsel 
Undermines Confidence In The Outcome Of The Trial. 
In addition to falling below reasonable professional 
standards, the failure of defense counsel to argue sufficiency of 
the evidence undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial. 
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
In Butterfield v. Cook, 817 P.2d 333 (Utah App. 1991), this 
Court held that the petitioner was not denied effective assistance 
of counsel when his attorney failed to "argue the evidence was 
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insufficient to support his rape conviction." Id. at 337. 
Declining to address whether it fell below reasonable professional 
standards to not argue sufficiency, the Court affirmed on the 
alternate basis that the trial outcome was not prejudiced by 
counsel's omission. Id. at 338. In so holding, the Court noted 
that the evidence against the petitioner was "substantial" and 
would was sufficient in light of the high standard of review 
applied to challenges regarding sufficiency of the evidence. Id. 
In particular, the evidence in Butterfield included the testimony 
of the rape victim and one other witness who was awakened by the 
victim's screams just after the rape occurred, who saw defendant 
naked from the waist down, "his genitals wet and dripping, " and who 
observed "blood and seminal fluid on the complainant's clothing." 
Id. at 337. 
Butterfield is distinguishable since there was substantially 
more evidence against the defendant in that case, it was more 
compelling, and was not entirely circumstantial. Unlike the direct 
victim testimony and the testimony of the witness who saw the 
defendant and made a number of incriminating observations just 
moments after the rape in Butterfield, there are no eyewitnesses of 
the crimes alleged here. Moreover, the other evidence against 
Madrid is entirely circumstantial and far less compelling of his 
guilt. Indeed, the evidence does not "preclude every reasonable 
hypothesis of innocence," but rather leaves open the question of 
whether he actually knew that the burglary was occurring. See 
Hill, 727 P.2d at 222; see supra Point I.A. 
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Given the ambiguous nature of the evidence, a challenge to its 
sufficiency likely would have prevailed under the standard of 
review for such claims, i.e., reasonable minds must have 
entertained a doubt as to Madrid's guilt since the evidence did not 
"precluded every reasonable hypothesis of innocence." Hill, 727 
P.2d at 222; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (prejudice 
assessed under totality of circumstances of case). Consequently, 
where defense counsel failed to challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence, the outcome of trial was likely different than it would 
have been had he done so. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
In light of the foregoing, defense counsel's failure to 
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for burglary and 
attempted theft constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel 
because (1) it fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness, 
and (2) but for [] counsel's deficient performance, there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of trial would have been 
different." Hovater, 914 P.2d at 39 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 694). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING A FLIGHT INSTRUCTION 
WHERE THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT ESTABLISH THAT MADRID WAS 
"FLEEING" THE SCENE. 
In the present case, Madrid objected to the admission of a 
flight instruction on the basis that there was insufficient 
evidence to support the instruction. R.110 [214-15] . The trial 
court allowed the instruction, reasoning that the language, "if 
any, " used therein alerted the jury that they were free to conclude 
that the evidence did not support flight. R.110[215] ; R.80 (flight 
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instruction). The trial court erred as a matter of law, however, 
in that there was not sufficient evidence of flight to justify the 
instruction. See Carlson, 934 P. 2d at 659 (propriety of jury 
instruction presents question of law upon review). Moreover, 
submission of the instruction prejudiced the outcome of the trial. 
See State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573, 576 (Utah 1983) (applying 
harmless error analysis regarding erroneous submission of jury 
instruction). 
"An instruction on flight is properly given if the jury could 
reasonably infer that the defendant's flight reflected 
consciousness of guilt, and flight requires neither the physical 
act of running nor the reaching of a far-away haven. Flight 
manifestly does require, however, a purpose to avoid being observed 
or arrested." California v. Crandell, 760 P.2d 423, 442 (Cal. 
1988) (citing California v. Cannady, 503 P.2d 585 (Cal. 1972)); 
accord State v. Howland, 761 P.2d 579, 580 (Utah App. 1988) 
(finding error where trial court gave flight instruction because 
flight did not occur after commission of crime charged); State v. 
Fairclough, 44 P.2d 692, 697 (Utah 1935) (finding no error where 
trial court gave flight instruction because evidence showed 
defendant quickly left crime scene in victim's car with his family 
and luggage, scratched victim's initials off the car, left lights 
on in home, and went to family in Montana via a circuitous route). 
With regard to flight instructions submitted over the 
objection of a defendant, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has 
noted that "courts [should be] wary of the probative value of 
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flight evidence." United States v. Williams. 33 F.3d 876, 879 (7th 
Cir. 1994) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 483 
n.10, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) ("[W]e have consistently 
doubted the probative value in criminal trials of evidence that the 
accused fled the scene of an actual or supposed crime")). 
Accordingly, that Court stated the "'probative value of flight 
as evidence of defendant's guilt depends on the degree of 
confidence with which four inferences can be drawn: (1) from 
behavior to flight; (2) from flight to consciousness of guilt; (3) 
from consciousness of guilt to consciousness of guilt concerning 
the crime charged; and (4) from consciousness of guilt concerning 
the crime charged to actual guilt of the crime charged.'" Id. 
(quoting United States v. Levine, 5 F.3d 1100, 1107 (7th Cir. 
1993), cert, denied 114 S.Ct. 1224, 127 L.Ed.2d 569 (1994)) (other 
citations omitted). 
Under the foregoing criteria, a flight instruction was not 
warranted in this case. As an initial matter, Madrid's behavior 
does not support the inference of flight. Paddock testified only 
that Madrid was walking quickly toward his car and that he seemed 
"panicky." R.101 [128] . This would be natural considering Paddock, 
even though he never saw Madrid on the premises, asked Madrid in a 
confrontational and accusatory manner, "what are you doing in my 
yard?" R.101[127]. Any person in Madrid's shoes would likewise 
step up the pace to get into their car rather than deal with 
someone accusing them of being in their yard although they never 
actually saw you there. See, e.g. State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 
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4 94 (Utah App. 1990) ("mere act of avoiding confrontation does not 
create an articulable suspicion"); In re D.J.f 532 A.2d 138, 141 
(D.C. 1987) (defendant "merely attempted to walk away, behavior 
indicative simply of a desire not to talk to police. No adverse 
inference may be drawn from such a desire") ; McClain v. State, 408 
So.2d 721, 722 (Fla. App. 1982) (defendant's "behavior which, taken 
for its most insidious implications, indicated only that he wanted 
to avoid police, could not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that 
he was engaged in criminal activity"). 
In addition, Paddock never stated that Madrid was running or 
otherwise attempting to avoid being observed by Paddock. Indeed, 
Paddock testified that Madrid was walking along the same sidewalk 
where Paddock stood, as opposed to walking on the other side of the 
street or in the opposite direction. R.101[127]. If Madrid were 
truly attempting to avoid observation, he would have behaved 
differently under the circumstances. Cf. Fairclough, 44 P. 2d at 
698 (evidence merited flight instruction where defendant took 
circuitous route to family home out of state and avoided detection 
by scratching victim's initials off of victim's car which defendant 
drove). Hence, the inference of guilt "'from behavior to flight'" 
under the facts of this case is not sufficiently supported by the 
evidence. Williams, 33 F.3d at 879 (quotation omitted). 
Likewise, the evidence does not adequately support the other 
Williams considerations, the inference "'from flight to 
consciousness of guilt; [] from consciousness of guilt to 
consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged; and [] from 
23 
consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged to actual guilt 
of the crime charged.'" Id, (quotation omitted). As noted above, 
Paddock testified that he asked Madrid what he was doing in the 
yard as Madrid approached him on the sidewalk. R.101 [127] . Given 
that Madrid was never in the yard, such an odd question would have 
certainly alerted him to some sort of guilt and prompted his 
quickened pace toward his car. Additionally, Madrid likely saw his 
the other man running toward the car at the same time that Paddock 
questioned Madrid, thereby heightening his sense of guilt for 
something that the other man did and/or was running from. 
R.101 [128] . 
However, as noted by Utah courts and other jurisdictions, 
flight and a general consciousness of guilt does not in and of 
itself imply a consciousness of guilt for the particular crime 
charged. See Talbot, 792 P.2d at 494 n.10; United States v. 
Silverman, 861 F.2d 571, 581 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. 
Rodriguez, 53 F.3d 1439, 1451 (7th Cir. 1995) . "The inference from 
proof of an unfocused consciousness of guilt to consciousness of 
guilt concerning the crime charged has proven especially 
problematic. Flight and concealment of identity can be consistent 
with innocence, or with guilt of misconduct unknown to the 
Government," Silverman, 861 F.3d at 581, or, in this case, 
Paddock. 
In fact, the flight evidence here does not support an 
inference of guilt of the particular crime charged. As noted supra 
Point I, at most, the evidence suggests that Madrid was looking at 
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a van down the street when the other man seized on an opportunity 
to break into the Paddock-Reeves home. Nothing suggests that 
Madrid was an accomplice to the burglary, or even knew that such 
was going on when he and the other person got into the red car 
together and drove off. Indeed, he was walking up the street where 
he was looking at a van toward the house when Paddock saw him, and 
not away from it as might be expected if he had just been involved 
in the burglary of it. R.101 [127]. Yet, even if Madrid had 
realized at some point that the other man had burgled the home, and 
therefore harbored a "consciousness of guilt concerning the crime 
charged, " his alleged haste to get into the car would not 
adequately support the inference that Madrid harbored "actual 
guilt" for the burglary. Williams, 33 F.3d at 879. Rather, it 
merely indicates that he wished to get out of a sticky situation 
quickly. Accordingly, the trial court erred as a matter of law in 
giving the flight instruction where such was not adequately 
supported by the evidence. See Howland, 761 P.2d at 580 (finding 
reversible error where trial court submitted flight instruction 
unsupported by evidence). 
As a final matter, the trial court's error merits reversal 
because it was prejudicial to Madrid's case. See Bales, 675 P. 2d 
at 576 (applying harmless error analysis in assessing impact of 
flight instruction). As noted by the Seventh Circuit, M/[b]ecause 
the probative value of flight evidence is often slight, there is a 
danger that a flight instruction will isolate and give undue weight 
to such evidence.7" United States v. Rodriguez, 53 F.3d 1439, 1451 
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(7th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Levine, 5 F.3d 1100, 1107 
(7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied 114 S.Ct. 1224, 127 L.Ed.2d 569 
(1994)) . 
This danger is particularly acute where, as here, the evidence 
against the defendant is entirely circumstantial and does not 
strongly suggest guilt. Cf., Bales, 675 P.2d at 576 (noting 
"[e]ven if there had been no evidence of flight, . . . the other 
evidence provided an ample basis for conviction") . As noted supra 
Point I, there is no direct evidence of Madrid's guilt, such as an 
eyewitness or the testimony of the other person seen running out of 
the yard which might implicate Madrid in the crime. Cf. id. (ample 
evidence for conviction even if flight instruction was error where 
there was eyewitness testimony and codefendant was in possession of 
jewelry taken from crime scene). Moreover, the circumstantial 
evidence in the present case is ambiguous as to Madrid's 
involvement in and knowledge of the burglary, leaving open a 
"reasonable hypothesis of innocence." Hill, 727 P.2d at 222. 
Accordingly, where the evidence in the present case does not 
amply suggest guilt, the trial court's error in giving a flight 
instruction likely "'isolate[d] and g[a]ve undue weight to such 
evidence.'" Rodriguez, 53 F.3d at 1451 (quoting Levine, 5 F.3d at 
1107) . Consequently, the jury was likely swayed toward the 
decision to convict Madrid of burglary. Hence, the trial court's 
error is not harmless and merits reversal of the burglary 
conviction. See, e.g. Howland, 761 P.2d at 580. 
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CONCLUSION 
Madrid respectfully requests this Court to reverse the 
burglary and attempted theft convictions for insufficient evidence. 
Should the Court find sufficient evidence, Madrid requests that his 
convictions be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial on 
the basis that the trial court committed harmful error in giving a 
flight instruction that was not justified by the evidence. 
SUBMITTED this IA*, day of March, 1999. 
C<ckMKj>Aj* e t ^ ^ ? • 
CATHERINE L. BEGIC J 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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